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What Does Finance Want? 
Is your money that good? 
—Bob Dylan 
Bankers dread war. More precisely, ﬁnancial communities within states 
favor cautious national security strategies and are acutely averse to war 
and to policies that risk war. This general rule holds across time and place, 
in a wide variety of political and economic settings. This chapter explains 
why ﬁnance has these preferences. The chapters that follow probe and 
evaluate this argument, and consider its implications for contemporary 
international politics. The short answer is: ﬁnance wants macroeconomic 
stability. Because war is largely incompatible with macroeconomic stabil­
ity, the ﬁnancial community is especially leery of risking armed conﬂict. 
This disposition is an important inﬂuence in contemporary international 
relations and will remain so, especially for as long as ﬁnancial globaliza­
tion endures. 
The principal argument of this book is that the caution of ﬁnance and 
its strong aversion to war are virtually universal traits; they are extraordi­
narily remarkable regularities that provide scholars of international rela­
tions with an important analytical tool for understanding world politics. 
The preferences of ﬁnance, especially since they are not felt with equal 
force in all states, affect the balance of power between states and inﬂuence 
the pattern of international conﬂict. Additionally, illustrating how the 
macroeconomic policy predilections of ﬁnance forge its foreign policy 
preferences enhances our understanding of the security strategies and 
choices that states embrace, by providing insights into how the deﬁnition 
of the national interest, and how best to advance that interest, is debated 
and contested by actors within societies. 
For many inquiries, it would seem (and it often is) inappropriate to 
lump together a potentially diverse group of actors with occasionally di­
vergent interests under the heading of ﬁnance. However, while acknowl­
edging this, I argue that ﬁnance—meaning banks, the ﬁnancial services 
sector, insurance companies, attendant ﬁnancial institutions, various ex­
change markets (especially for currencies, bonds, and equities), and their 
allies and afﬁliates in government (almost always central banks and usu­
ally treasury departments)—share a deeply held set of preferences regard­2  •  Chapter 1 
ing the basic domestic macroeconomic environment in which they oper­
ate. Thus only two claims are in effect here: these actors share a basic 
disposition regarding the management of the economy, and this disposi­
tion, this package of policy preferences, represents strongly held ﬁrst prin­
ciples that reﬂect the fundamental material and institutional interests of 
the parties concerned. I do not assume that members of the ﬁnancial com­
munity are in agreement on other issues; nor do I argue that ﬁnance acts 
in concert to advance its shared interests. 
This basic disposition of the ﬁnancial community is common across dis­
parate countries and consistent over long periods of time. Finance, above 
all else, wishes to operate in a macroeconomic environment conducive to 
its interests. In a phrase, the ideal playing ﬁeld is one of “macroeconomic 
stability.”1  In practice, this means low inﬂation and, just as important, 
policies designed to keep inﬂation low, robust and predictable real interest 
rates, stability in and maintenance of the value of the exchange rate and 
unfettered access to international ﬁnancial centers abroad, balanced gov­
ernment budgets, modest government spending, low rates of taxation, and 
small and clearly sustainable levels of government debt. 
WAR AND MONETARY DISORDER 
The problem for ﬁnance is that war, and even policies that risk war, tends 
to undermine each and every one of these core preferences. War almost 
always results in inﬂation and the erosion of monetary discipline, gyra­
tions in real interests (with negative real rates common as inﬂation out­
paces nominal increases), exchange rate depreciation and instability, inter­
ruptions  in  international  ﬁnancial  ﬂows,  and  huge  increases  in 
government spending, partly offset by increased taxes but typically re­
sulting in unbalanced budgets facilitated by expanding government debt 
and monetization (printing more money to pay the bills). 
In the history of the United States, wartime inﬂation has been as Ameri­
can as apple pie. Indeed, militarized macroeconomic mayhem predates 
the establishment of the republic. Massachusetts racked up large debts 
and liberally issued paper money during King William’s War (1689–97) 
and Queen Anne’s War (1702–13). During the Seven Years’ (French and 
1 As one astute reader pointed out, both “macroeconomic” and “stability” are used im­
precisely here. There are many key macroeconomic variables, such as output, growth, and 
employment, which are not of paramount concern to the ﬁnancial community. Also, an 
annual inﬂation rate of 40 percent would technically be more stable than rates that bounced 
around from 1 to 5 percent each year, yet ﬁnance would prefer the latter outcome. Thus the 
phrase “macroeconomic stability” should be understood simply as shorthand for the pack­
age of policy preferences and outcomes described here. What Does Finance Want?  •  3 
Indian) War many of the colonies resorted to the issue of paper notes 
to meet expenses, but even those that faithfully retained hard currency 
standards experienced wartime inﬂation. These difﬁculties, acutely felt at 
the time, proved to be but a warm-up for the collapse in the value of 
the Continental Currency during the Revolutionary War, which led to the 
once-common idiom “not worth a Continental.”2 Since independence, the 
American way of ﬁnancing war has typically been to divide the effort be­
tween new debt, money creation, and some increases in taxes. A common 
consequence of this has been inﬂation and “debt that ultimately yielded 
large, negative returns to bond holders.” Runaway inﬂation from the issue 
of greenbacks in the North and Confederate notes in the South during the 
Civil War is well established in American lore; but it was the War of 1812 
that led to the ﬁrst issue of circulating treasury notes, and the economic 
management  of  that  conﬂict  caused  “very  near[ly]  a  ﬁnancial  break­
down.” In its wars of the twentieth century, America did not ﬂirt as inti­
mately with ﬁnancial ruin, but the United States nevertheless emerged 
from its international conﬂicts carrying a legacy of inﬂation, larger govern­
ment, and increased public debt.3 
These wartime consequences and burdens do not pass unnoticed by the 
ﬁnancial community. The costs and ﬁnancial management of the Vietnam 
War weakened the dollar both at home, in the form of increased inﬂation, 
and abroad, by undermining the gold-dollar link at the foundation of the 
Bretton Woods international monetary regime (which collapsed in 1971). 
Even radical critics of U.S. foreign policy acknowledge that by 1968 the 
American ﬁnancial community was very alarmed by the economic conse­
quences of the war. Public statements by leading ofﬁcers of major U.S. 
banks in a variety of venues linked the war with the problems of inﬂation, 
2 Robert J. Schiller, “The Invention of Inﬂation-Indexed Bonds in Early America” (NBER 
Working Paper 10183, December 2003), pp. 5–7, 11; Elmus Wicker, “Colonial Monetary 
Standards Contrasted: Evidence from the Seven Years’ War,” Journal of Economic History 
45:4 (December 1985), pp. 872, 874, 876; Willard C. Fischer, “The Tabular Standard in 
Massachusetts History,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 27:3 (May 1913). 
3 Lee E. Ohanian, The Macroeconomic Effects of War Finance in the United States: 
Taxes, Inﬂation and Deﬁcit Finance (New York: Garland, 1998), pp. 3, 8 (quote), 12, 14, 
62–63; Donald H. Kagin, “Monetary Aspects of the Treasury Notes of the War of 1812,” 
Journal of Economic History 44:1 (March 1984), pp. 69, 77, 85–86; Charles J. Bullock, 
“Financing the War,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 31:3 (May 1917), p. 360 (quote), 
362, 366; Hugh Rockoff, “Price and Wage Controls in Four Wartime Periods,” Journal of 
Economic History 41:2 (June 1981), pp. 381, 386; Arthur A. Stein, The Nation at War 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 57, 77; James L. Clayton, “The 
Fiscal Cost of the Cold War to the United States: The First 25 Years, 1947–1971,” Western 
Political Quarterly 25:3 (September 1972), p. 389; George A. Lincoln, Economics of Na­
tional  Security:  Managing  America’s  Resources  for  Defense  (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1954), pp. 419, 421–22; Milton Friedman, “Price, Income, and Monetary Changes in Three 
Wartime Periods,” American Economic Review 42:2 (May 1952), pp. 615, 618. 4  •  Chapter 1 
international monetary disorder, and attacks on the dollar; Federal Re­
serve chair William McChesney Martin warned that the management of 
the war economy had led to “an intolerable budget deﬁcit and an intolera­
ble deﬁcit in our balance of payments.”4 While increasing dissent regard­
ing the war could be heard from other members of the business commu­
nity, it was ﬁnance whose interests felt the burdens of the war most 
directly and acutely. 
What is remarkable about the American experience with wartime mon­
etary upheaval is that it represents the rule, not the exception, across time 
and place. The association of war with macroeconomic instability is an 
enduring historical regularity, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, but with clear antecedents that stretch back throughout re­
corded history.5 
From ancient times, debt, debasement (reducing the precious-metal 
content of coins in order to stretch the state’s purchasing power), and 
even early experiments with paper currency and its debauchment were 
common features of war as money-starved governments resorted to what­
4 Robert Buzzanco, “What Happened to the New Left? Toward a Radical Reading of 
American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 23:4 (Fall 1999), pp. 593–94, 595 (Mar­
tin quote); Helmut Kramer and Helfried Bauer, “Imperialism, Intervention Capacity, and 
Foreign Policy Making: On the Political Economy of the US Intervention in Indochina,” 
Journal of Peace Research 9:4 (1972), pp. 291–92, 294; postrevisionist scholarship also 
describes the “intertwined...  problems of the balance of payments, the Vietnam War, and 
the strength of dollar”; see Robert M. Collins, “The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Wan­
ing of the ‘American Century,’ ” The American Historical Review 101:2 (April 1996), pp. 
401, 406 (quote), 415; Kevin Boyle, “The Price of Peace: Vietnam, the Pound, and the Crisis 
of American Empire,” Diplomatic History 27:1 (January 2003), p. 71, and Francis J. Gavin, 
Gold, Dollars and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). See also Lawrence Klein, “The 
Role of War in the Maintenance of American Economic Prosperity,” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society 115:6 (December 1971), pp. 507–8, 511–12, 516. 
5 On the general relationship between war and macroeconomic distress, see R. Anton 
Braun and Ellen R. McGrattan, “The Macroeconomics of War and Peace,” in NBER Mac­
roeconomics Annual 1993 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); Earl J. Hamilton, “The 
Role of War in Modern Inﬂation,” Journal of Economic History 37:1 (March 1977); David 
Hackett Fischer, The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996); Robert J. Barro, “Government Spending, Interest Rates, 
Prices and Budget Deﬁcits in the United Kingdom, 1701–1918,” Journal of Monetary Eco­
nomics 20 (1987); Daniel K. Benjamin and Lewis A. Kochin, “War, Prices and Interest 
Rates: A Martial Solution to Gibson’s Paradox,” in Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz 
(eds.), A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984); Herschel I. Grossman, “The Political Economy of War Debts and Inﬂation” 
(NBER Working Paper 2743, October 1988); Willard L. Thorp, “Postwar Depressions,” 
American Economic Review 30:5 (February 1941); Henry Oliver, “War and Inﬂation Since 
1790 in England, France, Germany and the United States,” American Economic Review 
30:5 (February 1941). What Does Finance Want?  •  5 
ever techniques they could call upon or invent to support their armies in 
the ﬁeld. The Peloponnesian War forced Athens to debase its coins due to 
the “stress of the war and its consequences.” (Arthur Burns compared the 
monetary disorder of that time to the terrible inﬂationary consequences 
of the First World War.) Some ﬁfteen hundred years later, the stability of 
the unshakable Byzantine gold coin was lost to the ﬁnancial strains of 
war; on the other side of the world, in the twelfth century, the Song dy­
nasty in China resorted to paper currency to meet its mounting wartime 
expenditures; a century after that, the occupation of South China (with 
the fall of the Southern Song) was ﬁnanced by a tenfold increase in the 
issue of paper money. The European wars of the late Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, generally across the Continent but most notably involving 
Britain and France, were often long and expensive affairs that also led to 
considerable monetary disorder.6 
In more modern times, especially with the more common use of paper 
currency and innovative forms of state ﬁnance, the relationship between 
war and macroeconomic distress became even more intimate. The Napo­
leonic Wars challenged state treasuries across the Continent: Spain bor­
rowed heavily, expanded the issue of paper currency dramatically, and 
was left to wrestle with the consequences of inﬂation and depreciation. 
Even Britain, which avoided Spain’s ﬁnancial blunders, was forced to 
break with gold and borrow money to ﬁght and endure its own inﬂation­
ary episode. Ironically, France, having previously shredded its credibility 
as an international borrower as a result of the hyperinﬂation of the assi­
gnats that ﬁnanced the French Revolution, suffered relatively less macro­
economic distress, though at the cost of a dramatic increase in domestic 
6 Arthur Burns, Money and Monetary Policy in Early Times (New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1965 [1927]), pp. 377 (quote), 378, 365–66, 385, 392, 406; see also Thomas Fi­
gueira, The Power of Money: Coinage and the Politics of the Athenian Empire (Philadel­
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 496–98, 508–11; Costas Kaplanis, “The 
Debasement of the ‘Dollar of the Middle Ages,’ ” Journal of Economic History 63:3 (Sep­
tember 2003), pp. 768, 782, 795; Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and 
Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 
51, 60–61; Nathan Sussman, “Debasements, Royal Revenues, and Inﬂation in France dur­
ing the Hundred Years’ War, 1415–1422,” Journal  of  Economic  History  53:1 (March 
1993), p. 45; Akira Motomura, “The Best and Worst of Currencies: Seigniorage and Cur­
rency Policy in Spain, 1597–1650,” Journal of Economic History 54:1 (March 1994), pp. 
105–6, 110, 117–18; Richard A. Kleer, “ ‘The Ruine of Their Diana’: Lowndes, Locke, 
and the Bankers,” History of Political Economy 36:3 (Fall 2004), pp. 533, 535; Harry A. 
Miskimin, Money and Power in Fifteenth-Century France (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1984), pp. 54–60; Carl Wennerland, “The Death Penalty as Monetary Policy: The 
Practice and Punishment of Monetary Crime, 1690–1830,” History of Political Economy 
36:1 (2004), pp. 134, 150. 6  •  Chapter 1 
taxation, including the introduction of an income tax.7  Other wars left 
similar results. To help pay for the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire 
expanded the production of the paper kaime, which in short order lost 
half of its value and generated considerable popular discontent. Through­
out the second half of the nineteenth century, neighboring Greece suffered 
crisis-related spikes in defense expenditures that generated budget deﬁcits, 
monetization, and inﬂation—its 1897 war with Turkey was ﬁnanced by 
paper money creation and a further surge in inﬂation.8 
Russia’s troubled monetary history was deeply intertwined with its mil­
itary adventures. From the late eighteenth century, Russia’s ambitions as 
a great power brought about increased taxation but still did not raise 
enough revenue to avoid chronic budget deﬁcits, ﬁnanced by expanded 
emissions of paper money and foreign loans. Monetary instability accom­
panied the ﬁrst Turkish war and the wars with Sweden, Poland, and Persia 
(and Turkey again) that followed. Contrapositively, the currency reform 
of 1839–43 was possible only after a decade of peace; this was washed 
away by the ﬂood of rubles printed to ﬁnance the Crimean War (the 
money supply doubled during the conﬂict). The subsequent monetary re­
habilitation of 1868–75 was set back by the military spending, monetiza­
tion, inﬂation, and indebtedness caused by the war with Turkey in 1877– 
78, a pattern that was repeated during the Russo-Japanese War. As one 
scholar of Russian macroeconomic history concluded, “The [monetary] 
expansions of 1853–57, 1877–78, and 1905 resulted from budget deﬁcits 
due to heavy expenditures for the Crimean, Balkan, and Japanese Wars, 
respectively.”9 
7 Earl J. Hamilton, “War and Inﬂation in Spain, 1780–1800,” Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics 59:1 (November 1944), pp. 36, 53, 55, 57; Michael D. Bordo and Eugene N. White, 
“A Tale of Two Currencies: British and French Finance during the Napoleonic Wars,” Jour­
nal of Economic History 51:2 (June 1991), pp. 303–4, 309–10, 314–15; Thomas J. Sargent 
and Franc ¸ois R. Velde, “Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution,” Journal of 
Political Economy 103:3 (June 1995), pp. 474–518. 
8 Sevket Pamuk, “The Evolution of Financial Institutions in the Ottoman Empire, 1600– 
1914,” Financial History Review 11:1 (2004), pp. 18, 25–26; Sevket Pamuk, A Monetary 
History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 142, 
211, 214; Christopher Clay, Gold for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance, 
1856–1881 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 47–49; Haim Gerber and Nachum T. Gross, 
“Inﬂation or Deﬂation in Nineteenth-Century Syria and Palestine,” Journal of Economic 
History 40:2 (June 1980), p. 353; Sophia Lazaretou, “Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Greece, 
1833–1914,” Journal of European Economic History 22:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 291–92, 297–98. 
9 Olga Crisp, “Russian Financial Policy and the Gold Standard at the End of the Nine­
teenth Century,” The Economic History Review, n.s., 6:2 (1953), pp. 156–57; Haim Barkai, 
“The Macro-Economics of Tsarist Russia in the Industrialization Era: Monetary Develop­
ments, the Balance of Payments, and the Gold Standard,” Journal of Economic History 
33:2 (June 1973), pp. 344, 345 (quote), 354, 357; William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in 
Russia, 1600–1914 (New York: Free Press, 1998), pp. 100–102, 269, 338–39, 405. What Does Finance Want?  •  7 
And, of course, no discussion of the macroeconomic consequences of 
war could be complete without reference to World War I, which over­
turned the preferences of ﬁnance one by one as if working its way method­
ically down a list—widespread suspension of convertibility, the disruption 
of international ﬁnance, ever greater government expenditures and accu­
mulations of debt, more and more taxation, and ﬁnally an increasingly 
desperate expansion of the money supply when all other options were 
exhausted, leading to the complete collapse of the domestic and interna­
tional European monetary order—which then contributed considerably 
to the crises of the interwar years.10 
These pathologies have by no means been limited to the United States 
or to Europe and its periphery. South America’s wars (more common 
before the remarkable long peace of the twentieth century, a puzzle wor­
thy of further attention) visited the same macroeconomic consequences 
on their participants. War between Argentina and Brazil in the 1820s 
brought about a “monetary cataclysm” in Argentina; the Brazilian real 
lost half of its value. The real fared even worse during the War of the 
Triple Alliance (1864–70); while all of the combatants struggled with war­
time inﬂation and Paraguay was left bankrupt and in ruins, Brazil, even 
in victory, faced the music of a ﬁvefold increase in its money supply, gener­
ated to ﬁght the war. The Paciﬁc War (1879–83) caused monetization, 
inﬂation, depreciation, and a burdensome debt in Chile, and even more 
dramatic  “intense  monetary  instability”  in  Peru,  where  inﬂation  ap­
proached 800 percent.11 
10 T. Balderston, “War Finance and Inﬂation in Britain and Germany, 1914–1918,” Eco­
nomic History Review, n.s., 42:2 (May 1989), pp. 223, 237; Pierro Sraffa, “Monetary Inﬂa­
tion in Italy During and after the War,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 17 (1993 [1920]), 
pp. 10–11, 14, 18–20; Boris Bakhmeteff, “War and Finance in Russia,” Annals of the Amer­
ican Academy of Political and Social Science  75 (January 1918), pp. 192–93, 196–98; 
E. Dana Durand, “Currency Inﬂation in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Poland,” 
American Economic Review 13:4 (December 1923), pp. 593, 597; Hamilton, “The Role of 
War,” p. 17; John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: 
Macmillan, 1971 [1919]), pp. 148–57. 
11 Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America 
(University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002), p. 132 (quote); I. Grinfeld, “Monetary 
Experiences of the Argentine Republic,” Political Science Quarterly 25:1 (March 1910), pp. 
110, 112–14; F. J. McLynn, “Consequences for Argentina of the War of the Triple Alliance 
1865–1870,” The Americas 41:1 (July 1984), pp. 89, 92; Norman T. Strauss, “Brazil after 
the Paraguay War: Six Years of Conﬂict, 1870–6,” Journal of Latin American Studies 10:1 
(May 1978), pp. 23, 35; Diego Abente, “Foreign Capital, Economic Elites and the State in 
Paraguay during the Liberal Republic (1870–1936),” Journal of Latin American Studies 
21:1 (February 1989), p. 62; Vera Blinn Reber, “The Demographics of Paraguay: A Reinter­
pretation of the Great War, 1864–70,” Hispanic American Historical Review 68:2 (May 
1988), p. 316; Paul Gootenberg, “Carneros y Chuno: Price Levels in Nineteenth-Century 
Peru,” Hispanic American Historical Review 70:1 (February 1990), pp. 6, 32 (quote); see 8  •  Chapter 1 
In every part of the world, and up to the present day, the song remains 
the same. Almost invariably, wherever and whenever there has been war, 
money has come under pressure, as seen in countless examples. Even Meiji 
Japan’s successful wars of the 1890s and 1900s disrupted the country’s 
ﬁnances and caused macroeconomic distress. China’s unhappy decade of 
war after 1937 saw inﬂation jump to 27, 51, and 181 percent in the ﬁrst 
three years of the ﬁghting and then remained in triple digits. The ﬁnancial 
economy was paralyzed; with negative real interest rates, banks were in­
creasingly unwilling to engage in the business of lending.12 In Korea the 
money supply doubled in 1951 and again in 1952; rampant wartime in­
ﬂation was a problem throughout the peninsula. War rattled India’s mac­
roeconomic stability in the 1960s, and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s 
had similarly predictable effects. In the 1990s war between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan ensured the descent of both countries’ currencies into hyperin­
ﬂation.13  History provides fewer messages with more clarity: war is an 
open invitation to macroeconomic disorder. 
also pp. 28, 30 for Peruvian inﬂation caused by other nineteenth-century wars; Thomas F. 
O’Brien Jr., “Chilean Elites and Foreign Investors: Chilean Nitrate Policy, 1880–82,” Jour­
nal of Latin American Studies 11:1 (May 1989), pp. 106–7, 111–12, 115, 118; Guillermo 
Subercaseaux, Monetary and Banking Policy of Chile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), pp. 
92, 94, 199 (note also the civil war inﬂation of 1891 and defense spending increases due to 
border tensions with Argentina, disrupting plans for monetary reform in 1894, 1895, and 
1898, pp. 101–2, 110, 133); see also Frank W. Fetter, Monetary Inﬂation in Chile (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1931), pp. 32, 43. 
12 Hugh T. Patrick, “External Equilibrium and Internal Convertibility: Financial Policy 
in Meiji Japan,” Journal of Economic History 25:2 (June 1965), pp. 198, 204; Guenther 
Stein, “Japanese State Finance,” Paciﬁc Affairs 10:4 (December 1937), pp. 393–95, 397; 
Choh-Ming Li, “Inﬂation in Wartime China,” Review of Economics and Statistics 27:1 
(February 1945), pp. 23, 27, 32; Andrew Chung Huang, “The Inﬂation in China,” Quar­
terly Journal of Economics 62:4 (August 1948), pp. 563, 568–69, 572; Frank M. Tamaga, 
“China’s Postwar Finances,” Paciﬁc Affairs 81:2 (June 1945), pp. 120, 122–24; Colin D. 
Campbell and Gordon C. Tullock, “Hyperinﬂation in China, 1937–49,” Journal of Political 
Economy 62:3 (June 1954), pp. 237–39. 
13 Colin Campbell and Gordon Tullock, “Some Little-Understood Aspects of Korea’s 
Monetary and Fiscal Systems,” American Economic Review 47:3 (June 1957), pp. 336, 
338–39; Youngil Lin, “Foreign Inﬂuence on the Economic Change in Korea: A Survey,” 
Journal of Asian Studies 28:1 (November 1968), pp. 90–91, 92–93; Rahul Mukherji, “In­
dia’s Aborted Liberalization—1966,” Paciﬁc Affairs 73:3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 376, 379; 
David Denoon, Devaluation under Pressure: India, Indonesia, Ghana (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1986), p. 41; Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq (Westport, CT: Green­
wood Press, 1994), pp. 80–81, 88, 98–99, and Thierry Gongora, “War Making and State 
Power in the Contemporary Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 
29:3 (August 1997), pp. 325, 327; Suzanne Godenberg, Pride of Small Nations: The Cauca­
sus and Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 73, 79, 270; Anders A ˚ slund 
et al., “How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist Countries,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1 (1996), pp. 225, 232. For an illustration from Africa, see Ben Naanen, 
“Economy within an Economy: The Manilla Currency, Exchange Rate Instability and Social What Does Finance Want?  •  9 
THE ARGUMENT 
The principal argument of this book is that because of the macroeconomic 
consequences  of  war,  ﬁnancial  communities  within  countries  will  be 
among the most cautious elements when it comes to waging war or sup­
porting foreign policies that risk war. Note that this is an indirect argu­
ment: ﬁnance is cautious about risking war because of war’s economic 
consequences, not because of any inherent preferences about the particu­
lar international controversy in question or attitudes about the legitimacy 
of competing claims in a given international conﬂict. Rather, the ﬁnancial 
community’s aversion to armed conﬂict is a residual of its basic disposi­
tion in favor of macroeconomic stability. This is also a relative argu­
ment—the claim is not that ﬁnance always opposes war, but rather that, 
as a general rule, ﬁnance will be among the most cautious and reluctant 
to risk and initiate war.14 
The aversion of ﬁnance to war has been noted by many others in the 
past, especially in the more distant past. The “mere hint” of international 
friction has been held responsible for unsettling money markets; French 
premier Jean-Baptiste Ville `le (who served as his own ﬁnance minister) 
neatly captured the foundation of these sentiments in 1827, when, reluc­
tant to celebrate the conclusion of a modest and successful military opera­
tion, he noted tersely, “Cannon ﬁre is bad for good money.” The interests 
of insurance companies are perhaps even more transparent in this regard. 
“War brings ruin,” one advocate stated plainly. “The business of insur­
ance is naturally allied with the forces that make for peace.” Almost a 
century ago prominent ﬁnancial observer Alexander Noyes explained that 
not only is the banking community inherently trepidant about war—as a 
“general rule . . . capital is slow to rush into war excitement”—but, fur­
ther, no other actors in society were “ﬁtted by instinct, training, disposi­
tion, and opportunity to insist that the government go slow in committing 
the country to a program of war.” Years later, Karl Polanyi would assert 
that haute ﬁnance acted purposefully to prevent war from breaking out 
between Europe’s great powers; he held that these efforts were crucial in 
facilitating the long peace of the nineteenth century.15 
Conditions in South-Eastern Nigeria, 1900–48,” Journal of African History 34:3 (1993), 
pp. 437, 442, 445. 
14 This construction (relative as opposed to absolute caution) does not undermine the 
falsiﬁability of the argument; however, as discussed later, it does inﬂuence the basis upon 
which the argument could be falsiﬁed. 
15 Hartley Withers, The Meaning of Money (London: Smith, Elder, 1909), p. 155 (ﬁrst 
quote); Andre ´ Jardin and Andre ´-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815–1848 (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 69 (Ville `le quote); David Starr Jordan, “War, 
Business and Insurance,” The Scientiﬁc Monthly 1:2 (November 1915), p. 175 (quotes); 10  •  Chapter 1 
Despite the fact that these observations, and others like them, have been 
expressed in the past, there has been no systematic investigation into the 
proposition of the caution of ﬁnance on the road to war. Such an investiga­
tion is the purpose of this book. If ﬁnancial caution is indeed a broad and 
general empirical regularity, then this book will contribute to an under­
standing of the behavior of states in world politics and of international 
relations more generally. Moreover, this ﬁnding generates an additional 
implication that I discuss in the concluding chapter: that the behavior of 
international ﬁnancial markets can discourage states from embarking on 
the path toward war. The logic is as follows: if war unnerves ﬁnance, 
and if international ﬁnancial markets reﬂect the cumulative sentiments of 
uncoordinated market actors, then ﬁnance (ﬁguratively) will withdraw 
from, or at least be especially wary of, those states that seem to be ap­
proaching the precipice of armed conﬂict. The greater the signiﬁcance of 
international ﬁnance, the more important this factor should be. By raising 
the opportunity costs that states face when considering a resort to arms, 
ﬁnancial globalization can serve, ceteris paribus, to inhibit war; crucially, 
however, states will vary considerably in their sensitivity to such pres­
sures. Thus, while the argument of this book is principally that bankers 
within states are more likely than others to favor appeasement, it also 
introduces the implication that international relations will at times be 
affected by the pressures states feel to appease the bankers. 
No Theory of War: A Partial Equilibrium Approach 
In the context of the discipline of international relations, this book is at 
the same time ambitious and modest in its reach. It is ambitious with 
regard to its strong claims of generalizability regarding ﬁnancial caution 
across time and place—this proposition approaches a lawlike statement. 
On the other hand, it is comparatively modest in terms of expectations 
about what this argument can tell us about the speciﬁc behavior of states 
and about particular outcomes in international politics. The ﬁndings of 
this book are rich with implications for understanding state behavior and 
world politics, including the prospects for U.S. power, the implications of 
the rise of China, and the vulnerability of weak states to insurgent groups 
Alexander D. Noyes, “International Arbitration and International Finance,” Journal of Po­
litical Economy 30:3 (March 1912), pp. 256, 261 (quotes); Karl Polanyi, The Great Trans­
formation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 
[1944]), pp. 9–11, 14. See also Jacob Viner, “The Economic Problem,” in George B. de 
Huszar (ed.), New Perspectives on Peace (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 
89–90, 96–98; Lionel Robbins, The Economic Causes of  War  (New York: Macmillan, 
1940), p. 58; and Roberto Rigobon, “The Effects of War Risk on U.S. Financial Markets” 
(NBER Working Paper 9609, April 2003), pp. 2, 11. What Does Finance Want?  •  11 
(these and other issues are explored in the conclusion). But it nevertheless 
holds a circumscribed view of what scholarship in international relations 
can hope to offer in terms of prediction. 
In particular, this book has no theory of war. That is, I make no predic­
tions about when war will occur. This requires some brief elaboration and 
justiﬁcation because predicting war, with a greater or lesser emphasis on 
qualifying conditions, is explicitly or implicitly the ambition of an enor­
mous body of literature in international relations, from all theoretical 
orientations and methodological approaches.16  However, the position I 
adopt here is that from a practical standpoint, war is essentially not a 
predictable phenomenon. 
There are three principal reasons why I am deeply skeptical of the enter­
prise of “predicting war” and thus why I avoid conditioning my analysis 
around such an approach in this book. First and most fundamentally is 
the enormous degree of complexity intrinsic to the causes of war, which 
involves a large number of explanatory variables, of which some are quite 
mercurial and idiosyncratic (the personal attributes of leaders is the most 
obvious example of this), and of which many are intricately interdepen­
dent rather than independent variables. Second is the lack of stability of 
these behavioral relationships over time, by which I mean that exactly the 
same set of circumstances that led to war in one period might not cause 
war in another, due to any number of factors, such as learning or a change 
in the normative environment. Third is the heterogeneity of the “depen­
dent variable,” that is, war. The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, China’s 
attack on Vietnam in 1979, Great Britain’s declaration of war on Ger­
many in 1939, and Chile’s decision to take on Bolivia and Peru in 1879 
were all decisions by states to go to war, but in each case “war” had 
a very different meaning, purpose, and implication. In the business of 
“predicting war,” lumping these cases together is problematic because it 
is likely that the paths to these different decisions followed distinct causal 
logics, but separating them out reduces for each category the number of 
16 See, for example, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, The Behavioral Origins of War 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: 
Power and the Roots of Conﬂict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Bennett and Stam 
are very much in the business of prediction (see, for example, p. 157), although they are 
very attentive to the challenges and pitfalls of such an enterprise (see esp. chapter 2, “Com­
parative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to Knowledge,” and pp. 165–66 on the chal­
lenge of generalizability). Van Evera is near the other end of the spectrum but nevertheless 
explores ﬁve principal hypotheses, in order to “apply them to explain history, infer policy 
predictions, and predict the future” (p. 3). Both works, it should be emphasized, are appro­
priately cautious; Bennett and Stam conclude, “There is no single story of war” and “In 
many ways we are as uncertain about the causes and likely timing of any individual war 
today as we were in 1942” (p. 201). Van Evera’s strongest predictive claim is a negative 
one; in the “total absence” of his ﬁve factors, “war rarely occurs” (p. 255). 12  •  Chapter 1 
cases of an already rare phenomenon and opens a Pandora’s box of con­
troversies about deﬁnitions and classiﬁcations. 
An example from economics illustrates further the formidable barriers 
to prediction in international relations. Even in the microeconomic ﬁeld 
of consumer choice, where fewer and more pristine independent variables 
are at work and an enormous universe of data is available for study, and 
where it can be comfortably assumed that behavioral relationships are 
stable (such as elasticities of income and demand and the market sensitiv­
ity of complements and substitutes), “prediction” nevertheless refers to 
the average behavioral response of a large population making similar 
choices and not to predictions about the behavior of any one speciﬁc indi­
vidual, which can vary broadly. This is perfectly satisfactory for consumer 
theory. Yet in international relations, the ultimate goal of the enterprise 
is capturing that markedly more elusive individual behavior (the behavior 
of a particular state) as opposed to the behavior of a hypothetical “aver­
age state”; thus, compared with consumer choice theory, predicting war 
and peace is a dramatically more ambitious enterprise in a vastly more 
challenging analytical setting.17 
Even in economics, no less an authority than Alfred Marshall, who very 
much saw economics as a science, was profoundly skeptical of prediction, 
and this informed his approach to the discipline. Marshall nicely eluci­
dated the problem of contingency in undermining the possibility of all 
but the most limited efforts at prediction: 
Prediction in economics must be hypothetical. Show an uninterrupted 
game at chess to an expert and he will be bold indeed if he prophesies 
its future stages. If either side make one move ever so little different 
from what he expected, all the following moves will be altered; and 
after two or three moves more the whole face of the game will have 
become different.18 
17 On the challenge of complexity in international relations, and in particular with refer­
ence to the challenges of predicting the behavior of individual states, see Charles P. Kindle­
berger, “A Monetary Economist on Power Politics,” World Politics 6:4 (July 1954), pp. 
509–10, and Kindleberger, “Scientiﬁc International Politics,” World Politics 11:1 (October 
1958), p. 86; see also Jonathan Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for War?” Security Stud­
ies 10:1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 143–50. 
18 Alfred Marshall, “Fragments,” in A. C. Pigou (ed.), Memorials of Alfred Marshall 
(London: Macmillan, 1925), p. 360 (quote); Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th 
ed. (London: Macmillan, 1920), esp. book I, chapter 3, “Economic Generalizations or 
Laws,” pp. 30–33. On the limits to prediction in economics, see also Frank H. Knight, 
“ ‘What Is Truth’ in Economics?” Journal of Political Economy 48:1 (February 1940), pp. 
29–31, and Andrew Rutten, “But It Will Never Be Science, Either,” Journal of Economic 
History 40:1 (March 1980), pp. 139, 141–42. As it turns out, Marshall was no slouch in 
the business of predicting war: “I shall not live to see our next war with Germany; but you What Does Finance Want?  •  13 
These types of challenges are, if anything, more applicable to and less 
surmountable in the study of international relations and suggest that ef­
forts should be redirected away from this goal. But this movement away 
from prediction is not as radical a turn as it might appear. It is not a 
retreat from—indeed it is wholly consistent with—rationalism, causality, 
generalizability, and falsiﬁability. One prominent international relations 
theorist, for example, renounced the goal of prediction—“We must give 
up the hope that a theory of international politics can have either the 
explanatory or the predictive power of a ‘hard’ science”—yet at the same 
time retained a vehement commitment to science.19  This book eschews 
prediction in a similar spirit. 
To draw on an analogy from economic theory once again, the approach 
here can be considered a “partial equilibrium” analysis. This approach, 
associated most famously with Alfred Marshall and his legacy in micro­
economics, is the investigation of the behavioral properties of the price 
of one good, assuming the prices of all other goods are held constant, as 
opposed to a “general equilibrium” approach that aims to solve simulta­
neously for all prices in the economy at one time.20 Transposing back to 
international relations, a “general equilibrium” perspective can be seen 
as one that seeks to predict war, while the partial equilibrium approach 
adopted here seeks to study and understand the behavioral properties of 
a particular variable in isolation. 
This method of inquiry is greatly inﬂuenced by the work of Charles 
Kindleberger, who adapted the concept of partial equilibrium for studies 
of  what he  dubbed  “historical economics.”  Kindleberger argued  that 
“there is not one all purpose economic theory or model that illuminates 
economic history,” emphasizing instead economics as a “toolbox” in 
which the practical economist is armed with a large set of theories (such 
as the law of one price, or Gresham’s law) that are applicable to and 
provide insights into a variety of settings. Historical economics is an exer­
cise in developing, honing (and possibly circumscribing or discarding) 
those tools, in particular by considering “how general are economic theo­
will, I expect”; Marshall to John Maynard Keynes, February 21, 1915, reprinted in Pigou, 
Memorials, p. 482. 
19 Morton A. Kaplan, “Problems of Theory Building and Theory Conﬁrmation in Inter­
national Politics,” World Politics 14:1 (October 1961), pp. 6, 8, 11, 20 (quote), 21, 23–24; 
Morton A. Kaplan, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International 
Relations,” World Politics 19:1 (October 1966), esp. pp. 1, 3, 12, 16, 19–20. 
20 Alfred Marshall, “Distribution and Exchange,” Economic Journal 8 (March 1898), 
pp. 37–38, 40, 47–48; Alfred Marshall, Principles, pp. 36, 131, 366, 369; Alfred Marshall, 
“The Present Position of Economics (1895),” reprinted in Pigou, Memorials, p. 168; George 
Stigler, “The Place of Marshall’s Principles in the Development of Economics,” in John K. 
Whitaker (ed.), Centenary Essays on Alfred Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p. 5. 14  •  Chapter 1 
rems or laws, how well they ﬁt case 2 if it is evident that they ﬁt case 1 
neatly.”21 Following Kindleberger, this book considers the preferences of 
the ﬁnancial community in a variety of prewar settings in order to evalu­
ate the “political theorem” of ﬁnancial caution proposed here and to gain 
insight into its implications and behavioral characteristics. 
Given this approach, evidence to falsify the thesis of this book would 
be found at the level of partial equilibrium (the preferences of ﬁnance) 
rather than at the level of general equilibrium (the occurrence of war). 
Since this is not a theory of war, variation in the pattern of armed conﬂict 
would neither support nor undermine the argument. Rather, contrary evi­
dence would be found in instances where the ﬁnancial community was 
among the most aggressive voices in society in prewar debates—those 
urging war or policies that risk or invite war. A modest number of such 
contrary examples could be considered exceptions to the general rule (and 
possibly even enhance our understanding of the factors that condition 
ﬁnancial caution); however, if such instances were relatively common, 
they would provide powerful evidence against my central claim. 
Appeasing Bankers in International Relations Theory 
The argument of this book does not ﬁt neatly into any of the main analyti­
cal perspectives of international relations theory. Because of this it is 
worthwhile to brieﬂy consider the relationship between the appeasing 
bankers thesis and the principal approaches to the discipline. The purpose 
of this short discussion is not to rehearse, advance, or debate various 
controversies in the practice of international relations theory, but rather 
(as with the earlier discussion of prediction) to situate for the reader the 
argument of this book in order to clarify its objectives and help establish 
the criteria by which its contributions can be evaluated. 
This book stands in obvious disagreement with much of the critical 
and Marxist-oriented literature on the causes of imperialism and war. In 
21 Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Laws and Economic History (Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1989), pp. ix (quote), x, 127, 193; Charles P. Kindleberger, Histori­
cal Economics: Art or Science? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 7, 9 
(“toolbox”); Charles P. Kindleberger, The Life of an Economist: An Autobiography (Cam­
bridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 194 (quote); see also Kindleberger, “Comparative Eco­
nomic History,” in Kindleberger (ed.), Economic Response: Comparative Studies in Trade, 
Finance and Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 3, and Kindle­
berger, “Scientiﬁc International Politics,” pp. 83–84. Kindleberger also explicitly rejects pre­
diction and elaborates further that “historical economics, as I view it, believes in partial 
equilibrium . . . and looks for patterns of uniformity but is wary of insisting on identity” 
(Historical Economics, p. 4). On the role of economic history in honing economic theory 
more generally, see Donald N. McClosky, “Does the Past Have Useful Economics?” Journal 
of Economic Literature 14:2 (June 1976), esp. pp. 448–53, “Better Economic Theory.” What Does Finance Want?  •  15 
particular, it holds the opposite perspective from John A. Hobson in his 
very inﬂuential work on imperialism. Hobson was not a Marxist, but his 
work shaped an important strand of neo-Marxist thought in this area, 
especially as articulated by Lenin, who was also greatly inﬂuenced by the 
distinct but complementary work of Rudolph Hilferding (and to a lesser 
extent by many others, including Rosa Luxembourg). Hobson’s argu­
ments are particularly noteworthy here because of his explicit emphasis 
on ﬁnance in particular as opposed to capitalism more generally (whereas 
increasingly in later generations of these arguments, ﬁnance, while still 
often exceptional, is intertwined with a consortium of capitalist interests). 
For Hobson, however (and for the argument of this book as well, if with 
very different implications), ﬁnance stands apart from the balance of the 
business community. Contra the appeasing bankers thesis, Hobson held 
that the “special interest of the ﬁnancier” was the source of “war, milita­
rism, and a ‘spirited foreign policy,’ ” all of which derived from the need 
to secure private markets abroad that could serve as outlets for surplus 
capital. Hilferding reached similar conclusions, arguing that “ﬁnance cap­
ital needs [the] state...t o  pursue an expansionist policy and the annex­
ation of new colonies.”22 
Hobson’s arguments (and other writings in this vein) have been sharply 
criticized, and those challenges are especially damaging with regard to the 
evidence pertaining to the speciﬁc claims advanced by Hobson and oth­
ers.23 While acknowledging these shortcomings, the spirit of these argu­
22 John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York: James Pott & Company, 1902), 
pp. 56, 63 (quote), 66, chapter 6 (“The Economic Taproot of Imperialism”), 113 (quote), 
380, 382–83; V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: Interna­
tional Publishers, 1939 [1917]), pp. 15, 31, 47, 78–79, 84, 102–4; Keith Grifﬁn and John 
Gurley, “Radical Analyses of Imperialism, the Third World, and the Transition to Socialism: 
A Survey Article,” Journal of Economic Literature 23:3 (September 1985), pp. 1092, 1096– 
97; E. M. Winslow, “Marxian, Liberal and Sociological Theories of Imperialism,” Journal 
of Political Economy 39:6 (December 1931), pp. 723–24, 726–28. Hilferding derived his 
conclusions from his efforts to establish a Marxist theory of money. Rudolph Hilferding, 
Finance Capital: A Study on the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (ed. Tom Bot­
tomore) (London: Routledge, Keegan and Paul, 1981 [1910]), pp. 311, 314, 317–18, 322– 
23, 330, 334 (quote), 335, 366. See also Harold James, “Rudolf Hilferding and the Applica­
tion of the Political Economy of the Second International,” The Historical Journal 24:4 
(1981), esp. pp. 857, 868; and Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism (trans. P. S. 
Falla) (New York: Random House, 1980), pp. 17, 36–38, 41–43, 47. 
23 P. J. Cain, Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance, 1887– 
1938 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 122–24, 235, 277–81; see also 
William Langer, “A Critique of Imperialism,” Foreign Affairs 14 (1935–36), 102–19; D. K. 
Fieldhouse, “Imperialism: An Historical Revision,” Economic History Review, n.s., 14:2 
(1961), pp. 187–209; Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), pp. 44, 46, 58, 63–66; John R. Oneal and Frances Oneal, “Hegemony, Impe­
rialism, and the Proﬁtability of Foreign Investments,” International  Organization  42:2 
(1988), pp. 347–73. 16  •  Chapter 1 
ments, however, still ﬁnds support among some scholars.24  This book 
clashes with “ﬁnancial imperialism” arguments more generally at the level 
of expectations about the preferences and motivations of ﬁnance and 
reaches the opposite conclusions about their implications for interna­
tional relations. 
Not only does the appeasing bankers thesis reverse Marxist expecta­
tions about ﬁnance and war, it also trafﬁcs in variables typically associ­
ated with liberal theory: the narrow interests of actors within societies and 
the role and consequences of market forces.25  But despite these notable 
afﬁnities, other departures from liberalism, regarding the national inter­
est, the ambiguous role of “peaceful ﬁnance,” and interdependence, disaf­
fect the approach adopted here from important elements of liberal theory. 
Of paramount importance is the role of the national interest. Stephen 
Krasner adroitly distinguished liberalism from statism on this basic foun­
dation. For the former, “an inescapable implication of their position is 
that government policy is a reﬂection of whatever groups have power in 
society,” but for the latter, “the objectives sought by the state cannot be 
reduced to some summation of private desires.”26 This approach, which 
reduces the national interest to some combination of particular interests, 
remains at the heart of contemporary liberal theory.27  The perspective 
here takes as its point of departure the idealized statist conception of the 
national interest (albeit with some qualiﬁcation, as discussed later). 
A second important departure from liberalism concerns the tendency 
of liberal theory to suggest that the peaceful instincts it attributes to capi­
talists (or at least to merchants) is normatively a good thing. From the 
perspective of this book, this is not necessarily the case. Without advocat­
24 See, for example, Gregory P. Nowell, “Imperialism and the Era of Falling Prices,” Jour­
nal of Post-Keynesian Economics 25:2 (Winter 2002–3), pp. 317, 320, 325. 
25 On  liberalism,  see  Andrew  Moravcsik,  “Taking  Preferences  Seriously:  A  Liberal 
Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51:4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 
513–53. 
26 Stephen Krasner, Defending  the  National  Interest  (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), pp. 30, 5–6 (quotes); see also pp. 10–12, 28, 36. 
27 See, for example, Gary Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for 
Political Inﬂuence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98:3 (August 1983), pp. 371–400; 
Peter Trubowitz, Deﬁning the National Interest: Conﬂict and Change in American Foreign 
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Benjamin O. Fordham, “Economic 
Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War Era U.S. Foreign Policy,” International 
Organization 52:2 (Spring 1998), pp. 359–96; Jeffry Frieden, “Sectoral Conﬂict and For­
eign Economic Policy, 1914–1940,” International Organization 42:1 (Winter 1988), pp. 
59–90. Additive of particular interests but with a greater emphasis on contingency are Peter 
Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Cri­
ses (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coali­
tions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989). What Does Finance Want?  •  17 
ing “war” as an abstract concept, there may nevertheless be times when 
an assertive foreign policy, or even the resort to arms, is in a state’s best 
interest and is even proper. Yet even in these cases, ﬁnance will be reluc­
tant to ﬁght. The principal argument of this book is not that ﬁnance is 
“right” about foreign policy but rather, motivated by concerns for the 
domestic macroeconomic consequences, that ﬁnance seeks to avoid war. 
Sometimes that caution will be “wrong,” undermine the national interest, 
and even threaten the security of the nation. 
Finally, on questions of war and peace, liberal theory tends to lump 
ﬁnance with other capitalist or commercial interests, while this book is in 
the business of considering what is distinct and exceptional about the 
ﬁnancial community.28 This matters, for example, with regard to the rela­
tionship  between  interstate  interdependence  and  war—an  association 
that has been an important element of liberal theory but is held at arm’s 
length by the analysis here.29 Certainly, from a partial equilibrium perspec­
tive, the deductive logic of the liberal case is plausible (all other things 
held constant, increased levels of interdependence between two states will 
create a net disincentive for war between them). However, with my central 
emphasis on the indirect consequences of actors’ macroeconomic prefer­
ences, as well as my self-conscious abstention from predicting war, the 
approach here is orthogonal to and agnostic regarding the relationship 
between interstate interdependence and war.30 Beyond that, the emphasis 
on ﬁnance here actually suggests a modest and implicit challenge to liberal 
arguments based on the presumed paciﬁc inﬂuences of capitalism and 
commerce.31 The ﬁnancial community has a strong and general interest 
28 It is common in analyses of foreign policy debates from various analytical perspectives 
to lump together the elements of a “free trade coalition”; see, for example, Steven E. Lobell, 
The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade and Domestic Politics (Ann Arbor: Uni­
versity of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 21–23. However, the preferences of the ﬁnancial com­
munity are often different from those of other business groups. See, for example, David E. 
Kaun, “War and Wall Street: The Impact of Military Conﬂict on Investor Attitudes,” Cam­
bridge Journal of Economics 14 (1990), pp. 439–40. 
29 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Tran­
sition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” pp. 520– 
21, 528–30. 
30 On this issue, see Edward Mansﬁeld and Brian Pollins, Economic Interdependence and 
International Conﬂict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2003); Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Peter Gleditsch, 
Globalization  and  Armed  Conﬂict  (Lantham,  MD:  Roman  and  Littleﬁeld,  2003);  and 
Charles P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the National Economy (New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1962). 
31 See, for example, Joseph Schumpeter, “The Sociology of Imperialisms,” in Richard 
Swedberg (ed.), Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1991), and Christopher Way, Manchester Revisited: Eco­
nomic Interdependence and Conﬂict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). 18  •  Chapter 1 
in the preservation of peace. But there is no similar unambiguous and 
general compelling interest for capitalists, businesspeople, or even those 
engaged in international trade to fear war. While individual capitalists, 
businesspeople, or traders might ﬁnd their narrow interests undermined 
by their home country’s participation in a particular war, there is no 
reason why the interests of such actors would necessarily be harmed by 
any armed conﬂict in general; indeed, there are a good many wars in 
which particular elements of the business and commercial community 
might stand to gain handsomely. Thus, the bedrock foundations of ﬁnan­
cial caution contrast with and call attention to the absence of such a 
primordial disposition in business and commerce (although elements of 
these groups might be strongly opposed to particular conﬂicts). More­
over, this suggests (although it is not in the scope of this book to explore) 
that if the preferences of the ﬁnancial community are withdrawn from 
the mix, the remaining inﬂuences of capitalism and commerce on war 
generally might be less apparent and instead more ﬂuid, indeterminate, 
and contingent. 
This book also has afﬁnities with realism, most obviously with its 
baseline conception of world politics: states are the principal actors, and 
they pursue their security and self-interests in ways that are shaped by 
the context of anarchy and conditioned by the possibility of war (the 
prospects for which can vary considerably due to the intensity of the secu­
rity dilemma and other factors).32 However, this book also departs from 
realist orthodoxy, with two large steps away from characteristics that 
are common to many theories derived in a realist tradition: the primacy 
of structure (or systemic-level) analysis and the inviolability of a unique 
national interest. 
Systemic-level analysis has captured the imagination of most realist 
thinkers, although one need not imply the other. Structural variables in 
international  relations—the  distribution  of  power  between  states  and 
changes to the distribution of that power over time—are attractive, as 
they are parsimonious and generalizable. And for the analysis of interna­
tional relations, they are important for understanding the environment in 
which states act.33 Nevertheless, this book places much less emphasis on 
systemic-level analysis. Although valuable, and not to be dispensed with, 
32 The literature on realism is enormous and alive with active controversy. For an over­
view of the rich variety of theories in the realist tradition, see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of 
War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism (New York: Norton, 1997), part 1. 
33 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979); 
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981). Waltz’s static approach aims to operate solely at the level of the system; Gilpin’s 
dynamic theory is also systemic in terms of the framework of the theory, but his analysis 
ranges freely across all levels of analysis. What Does Finance Want?  •  19 
structural variables are largely indeterminate in explaining world poli­
tics.34 As theories inspired by a microeconomic analogy of choice under 
market scarcity aver, the international system does indeed impose con­
straints on the states that constitute it in a way analogous to the manner 
in which the range of choices presented to consumers and ﬁrms is ex­
pressed by market forces that derive from the collective behavior of all 
participants but that are beyond the control of any particular actor. But 
even in the pristine world of microeconomics, with similar ﬁrms seeking 
singular goals (maximizing proﬁts or market share), the deterministic im­
plications of systemic market pressure (once again, on the “average” 
actor)  are  dependent  on  very  strict  assumptions  of  “perfect  competi­
tion”—an environment characterized by a very large set of small actors 
that have no market power but instead are “price takers.” As the idealized 
assumption of perfect competition is relaxed, market forces remain vital 
but individual choices become increasingly central to explaining behavior. 
In particular, large ﬁrms in oligopolistic settings, while certainly not un­
constrained by market forces, nevertheless enjoy considerable discretion 
as to how they pursue their goals. 
In international relations that range of freedom is at least an order of 
magnitude greater. States in world politics are much more like large oli­
gopolists than small ﬁrms under perfect competition, and this is especially 
true for great powers whose behavior attracts the lion’s share of the atten­
tion in international relations theory. Further, despite their common attri­
butes, states are less similar to each other than are ﬁrms of the same indus­
try, and despite a common desire for survival, states are more likely than 
ﬁrms to also harbor a broader range of goals selected from a larger set of 
possibilities. And even in the pursuit of the most narrow, common goal— 
survival—states will respond less predictably to the pressures of anarchy 
than ﬁrms will to market forces, because they can. Firms that make mis­
takes are more likely to be selected out of the system than states are when 
they pursue suboptimal national security strategies, due to the fact that, 
as Adam Smith observed, “there is a great deal of ruin in a nation.”35 
Structure thus informs importantly the environment in which all states 
act, but in that context all states, and especially great powers, enjoy con­
siderable discretion with regard to how they pursue their goals and what 
sacriﬁces they make in the face of constraints. This is again the case with 
the essentially “structural” variable featured in this book—less salient in 
34 For a good discussion of this, see Joseph Nye, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World 
Politics 40:2 (January 1988), esp. pp. 235, 242, 245. My thinking on these issues has bene­
ﬁted greatly from exchanges at the National Intelligence Council’s workshops, “Strategic 
Responses to American Preeminence,” hosted by John Ikenberry. 
35 John Rae, Life of Adam Smith (London: Macmillan, 1895), p. 343. 20  •  Chapter 1 
most of the chapters but considered more closely in the concluding chap­
ter: the degree of global ﬁnancial integration. As mentioned earlier, given 
the preferences of the ﬁnancial community, those preferences, as “ex­
pressed” by international market forces, act as a systemic disincentive to 
the initiation of war to an extent directly related to the relative size and 
signiﬁcance of global ﬁnancial markets (and to the relative importance of 
access to international ﬁnance to the state in question). While not a purely 
structural variable (as the degree of general openness or closure is the 
product of states’ choices), the general level of global capital mobility 
reﬂects the choices of a few big states, and those choices are reinforcing; 
thus, as a practical matter, the large majority of states are presented with 
a common systemic pressure (the level of global capital mobility) over 
which they have little if any control.36 
Financial globalization, as a systemic constraint, should not be con­
ﬂated with interstate interdependence.37 Additionally, in keeping with the 
partial equilibrium approach of this book, the observation that states face 
a common external pressure that raises (or lowers) uniformly the costs of 
pursuing policies that deviate from the preferences of the ﬁnancial com­
munity is not deterministic. States always retain the ability to pursue poli­
cies at odds with international markets (and if they so choose, to restrict 
their own interactions with such markets). The point here is simply that 
those choices come with costs: the direct costs imposed by the conse­
quences of international market reaction, and the opportunity costs of 
international ﬁnancial options foreclosed.38 These costs vary proportion­
36 States, of course, can impose their own capital controls; the variable in question refers 
to the external environment. On capital mobility as a systemic constraint, see David An­
drews, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International 
Monetary Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (1994), pp. 193–218. Andrews 
makes the case that capital mobility can be treated as a structural variable; on technical 
grounds, this is debatable; state choice fundamentally shapes the extent of capital mobility 
(though it may indeed be very difﬁcult to recapture those forces once liberated), but states 
cannot choose, for example, the distribution of power between them. However, the contri­
butions of Andrews’s article stand regardless of this deﬁnitional issue. 
37 Interdependence refers to relations between two states, and theories of interdependence 
and war consider how these relations affect the prospects for war between them. Financial 
globalization is a general, systemic force that affects each state individually, and it affects 
each state’s general calculations about the costs and beneﬁts of war and ambitious national 
security strategies. Intense economic interdependence between two states can occur in the 
absence of globalized ﬁnance; states’ national security strategies can be very sensitive to 
globalized ﬁnance unrelated to a particular bilateral economic relationship. 
38 The logic regarding the opportunity costs of disregarding the preferences of international 
ﬁnance is similar to the analysis of the opportunity costs of economic closure in Jeffry Frieden 
and Ronald Rogowski’s “The Impact of the International Economy on National Economies: 
An Analytical Overview,” in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (eds.), Internationalization 
and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 32–33. What Does Finance Want?  •  21 
ately with the extent of international ﬁnancial integration and the relative 
size of international ﬁnancial markets; thus in periods of “globalized ﬁ­
nance,” the costs of making the choice to deviate from the ﬁnancial ortho­
doxy are relatively high. As discussed in the concluding chapter, interna­
tional relations will be affected by the fact that particular states will be 
more or less sensitive to these costs. 
This book also departs from the realist mainstream, and here the stakes 
are somewhat higher (as one can engage in broadly “realist” analysis 
without insisting on the primacy of structural variables in explaining be­
havior) by probing the concept of the “national interest.” While I have 
rejected the liberal vision of a pluralist national interest in favor of the 
perspective that states as actors enjoy considerable autonomy and pursue 
broadly deﬁned national interests, I emphasize that the national interest 
is malleable and contested, rather than always self-evident or unique.39 
Realists have emphasized the tension between the national interest and 
economic interests, principally in considering the need to make departures 
from policies that maximize wealth and short-run economic growth in 
the name of national security.40 But they have been less attentive to the 
contestation of the national interest and to the ways in which domestic 
economic conﬂicts can throw off-key the pursuit of the national interest. 
Anarchy does impose real (and dangerous) proscriptions against many 
policies states might choose. Nevertheless, there remains a plausible range 
of foreign policy orientations, quite distinct from one another, which 
could arguably be deﬁned as “the national interest”—and various actors 
within societies will have distinct visions of what the national interest is 
and how it can best be served. These conﬂicts and competing visions are 
a central part of the analyses that follow. 
The concept of a contested national interest has a constructivist ﬂavor; 
moreover, when dealing with monetary politics, the role of ideology, not 
simply reducible  to  interests,  always lurks in the  background.41  The 
39 On the centrality of the national interest for the realist tradition, see Hans Morgenthau, 
In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Knopf, 1951); George F. Kennan, American 
Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and Krasner, De­
fending the National Interest,p .5 3 . 
40 Jacob Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics 1:1 (October 1948), esp. pp. 5, 10, 17; Robert 
Gilpin, “The Politics of Transnational Relations,” International Organization 25:3 (Sum­
mer 1971), pp. 410, 403–4, 409; Michael Mastanduno, “Economics and Security in State­
craft and Scholarship,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 827, 842–43, 
848; Jonathan Kirshner, “The Political Economy of Realism,” in Michael Mastanduno and 
Ethan Kapstein (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
41 See, for example, Kathleen McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in 
the  European  Union  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jonathan Kirshner, “Ex­22  •  Chapter 1 
preferences of ﬁnance are more than just beliefs; they are also held as 
an  ideology.  And  the  extent  to  which  this  ideology  is  in  or  out  of 
favor outside the ﬁnancial community, something that is not readily ac­
counted for by liberal or realist approaches, matters greatly. However, 
the materialist roots of the argument here also cut against the grain of 
much that is central to the constructivist enterprise, such as culture, 
norms, and identity.42 
Thus while the approach here has afﬁnities with attributes of realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism, it also diverges from each and is an exem­
plar of none. Informed by the partial equilibrium approach championed 
by Kindleberger, this book is neither designed nor well suited to contrib­
ute to debates between dueling paradigms (beyond its contradiction of 
related Marxist theories) but is rather an example of what Katzenstein 
and Sil have dubbed “analytical eclecticism,” and as such it “deﬁes analyt­
ical capture by any one paradigm.”43 It can be situated with those works 
from a variety of perspectives that seek to explain the behavior of states 
by focusing on domestic groups and political competition between them, 
plaining Choices about Money: Disentangling Power, Ideas, and Conﬂict,” in Jonathan 
Kirshner (ed.), Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics (Ithaca: Cor­
nell University Press, 2003); Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial 
Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Jacqueline 
Best, The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance (Ith­
aca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Robert M. Fishman and Anthony M. Messina (eds.), 
Year of the Euro: The Cultural, Social and Political Import of Europe’s Common Currency 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). 
42 For an excellent entre ´e into the burgeoning constructivist literature, see Peter Kat­
zenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996). On the malleability of the national interest, rooted 
in identity politics, norms, and culture, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in Interna­
tional Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Henry Nau, At Home Abroad: Iden­
tity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Rawi 
Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); 
Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
43 Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical 
Eclecticism,” in J. J. Suh, Peter Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (eds.), Rethinking Security in 
East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efﬁciency (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Peter 
Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asia-Paciﬁc Security, and the Case for Analytic 
Eclecticism,” International Security 26:3 (Winter 2001–2), p. 154 (quote); Rudra Sil, “Prob­
lems Chasing Methods or Methods Chasing Problems? Research Communities, Constrained 
Pluralism, and the Role of Eclecticism,” in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. 
Masoud (eds.), Problems  and Methods  in the  Study  of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Samuel M. Makinda, “International Society and Eclecticism in Inter­
national Relations Theory,” Cooperation and Conﬂict 35:2 (2000), pp. 205–16; see also 
Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 
(spring 1998), pp. 30, 34, 44. What Does Finance Want?  •  23 
and on the tensions that can exist between the pursuit of particular inter­
ests and the national interest.44 
EVALUATING THE ARGUMENT 
As mentioned earlier, evidence to support (or to undermine) the argument 
of this book will be found in the positioning of the ﬁnancial community 
within societies in pre-war settings. Relative ﬁnancial caution is consistent 
with the argument; episodes where ﬁnance is among those leading the 
charge toward war is powerful evidence against it. In this ﬁnal section of 
this chapter, I discuss the logic behind the selection of the cases chosen 
for close scrutiny. First of all, the universe of potential cases is limited to 
prewar settings; that is, cases where war was discussed as a possibility 
and did occur.45 Limiting potential cases to prewar settings ensures that 
we are indeed looking at prewar preferences, instances where we know 
for a fact that the risk of war was genuine because war did indeed occur. 
In theory the behavior of ﬁnance (and other actors) in crisis situations 
where war seemed likely but was ultimately avoided could also con­
ceivably offer attractive insights. But such cases would too easily get 
bogged down in debates about how likely war actually was, or whether 
various actors were strategically posturing in these debates with the as­
sumption that war would not occur. Limiting potential prewar settings 
to actual prewar settings sweeps aside these unnecessary controversies. 
(This methodological choice does risk giving the superﬁcial impression 
that ﬁnance never gets what it wants. But as the cases make clear, this is 
simply not so.)46 
44 For examples of this type of work, see Benjamin Cohen, In Whose Interest? Interna­
tional Banking and American Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); 
Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, “Strategy, Economic Relations and the Deﬁnition of 
National Interests,” Security Studies 9:1/2 (1999–2000), pp. 119–56; Eckhart Kehr, “Anglo­
phobia and Weltpolitik,” in Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein (eds.), The Do­
mestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Steven E. Lobell, 
“War Is Politics: Offensive Realism, Domestic Politics and Security Strategies,” Security 
Studies 12:2 (Winter 2002–3), pp. 165–96; Stephen David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and 
Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Jack 
Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
45 This does not raise the problem of sampling on the dependent variable, because the 
dependent variable in question is not the occurrence of war but the preferences of ﬁnance 
(and the positioning of the ﬁnancial community within the prewar debate). 
46 Not surprisingly, ﬁnance sometimes wins and sometimes loses, and often it salvages 
something in defeat. As described in the chapters that follow, Japanese ﬁnanciers got their 
way on foreign policy throughout the 1920s; France’s problem was not that ﬁnance lost but 24  •  Chapter 1 
In the context of prewar settings, three additional attributes for possible 
cases are especially appealing. First, to test, as best as possible, the appeas­
ing bankers hypothesis, the investigator should not know the preferences 
of the ﬁnancial community regarding the prospects for war and peace in 
a particular case before embarking on the research. Second, recalling that 
the partial equilibrium approach of this book seeks to understand the 
behavior and contingent characteristics of the variable in question, each 
case has potentially more to offer the entire enterprise if it represents a 
relatively distinct setting. A heterogeneous set of cases promises to expand 
the range of conditions under which the behavior of the bankers can be 
evaluated; additionally, if we ﬁnd that the preferences of ﬁnance are singu­
larly consistent in diverse environments, this would provide further sup­
port for the main argument. Third, each case should bring something 
unique (and analytically valuable) to the table. 
The cases in the chapters that follow meet these criteria extremely well. 
I avoided some cases because they failed to meet these criteria, even 
though they ﬁt the argument remarkably well. In particular, this book 
avoids the entire pre–World War I setting, as well as the case of Britain in 
the interwar period. These prominent omissions merit brief attention here 
to quickly illustrate that they are entirely consistent with the argument of 
this book and to explain the basis of the decision not to consider them as 
full-blown case studies. 
The behavior of ﬁnancial communities within states in the period lead­
ing up to World War I ﬁts precisely the argument of this book. Especially 
with regard to Great Britain, this will not come as a surprise to most 
readers. Paul Kennedy famously observed the fundamental tension be­
tween “strategy and ﬁnance” in this period and the incompatibility of the 
City of London’s position as the world’s ﬁnancial hub with the prospects 
for confrontation and war with Germany.47 It is worth noting, however, 
that if anything, this conventional wisdom understates the dread (and 
shock) with which the City viewed the approach and outbreak of war on 
the Continent and the extent to which ﬁnance hoped that Britain might 
that it won so many battles in the interwar period. British ﬁnance won the day time and 
time again in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, so much so that ﬁnance-induced defense cuts 
came close to preventing the British from even attempting to retake the Falklands. Finally, 
and of course, in the universe of cases where war approached but did not occur, the prefer­
ences of ﬁnance likely contributed to some of those outcomes. 
47 Paul Kennedy, “Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-Century Britain,” International 
History Review 3:1 (1981), pp. 44–61; see also Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplo­
macy: Background Inﬂuences on British External Policy, 1865–1900 (London: Fontana, 
1981), pp. 27, 68, 128, 137; David French, British Economic Planning, 1905–1915 (Lon­
don: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 13–14, 53, 67, 70, 91; Aaron Friedberg, The 
Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1988), pp. 89, 92–93, 99. What Does Finance Want?  •  25 
stay out of the conﬂict. Moreover, when push came to shove, with the 
breakdown of international payments that accompanied the outbreak of 
war, many of the City’s leading commercial banks acted ignobly, covering 
their own positions and contributing to a ﬁnancial crisis in Britain that 
was diffused only by cooler heads that prevailed at the Bank of England 
and the Treasury. As Keynes described at the time, with the outbreak of 
war, “the City was a very sick man, dazed and feverish, called in to pre­
scribe for his own case,” with the result that many of the captains of 
ﬁnance were “too much overwhelmed by the dangers, to which they saw 
their own fortunes and good names exposed, to have much wits left for 
the public interest and public safety.”48 
The reaction of the British ﬁnancial community to the war was of a 
kind with the reaction of ﬁnancial communities elsewhere, as belligerents 
suspended the convertibility of their currencies, markets panicked, and 
bankers were left scrambling to cover their positions in the wake of the 
unraveling of the intricate web of international ﬁnancial ﬂows. New York 
City’s Bankers Magazine saw in the war “widespread disaster” for credit 
and banking and warned that “our own land, though suffering least of 
all, shall not be exempt” from the consequences. The very distinct per­
spective of the ﬁnancial community on war was summarized in a subse­
quent editorial: “Among the countless brood of evils born of war few 
transcend unsound ‘money’ in their capacity to inﬂict injury upon the 
human race.”49 In Germany, bankers (while more prepared for the conﬂict 
than their British counterparts), on questions of war and peace, were also 
positioned within society as would be anticipated by this theory. The Ger­
man ﬁnancial community was, like its counterparts elsewhere, wary of 
uncertain adventurism and alarmed by the prospect of war and the threat 
48 Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Ofﬁce wrote of “panic in the city,” in a memo sent to 
Foreign Secretary Edward Grey on July 31, reprinted in G. D. Gooch and H. Temperley 
(eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (London: HMSO, 1926– 
1938), vol. 11, The Outbreak of War, p. 228; see also the similar assessment of Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. 1, 1914–1915 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1933), p. 68; David Kynaston, The City of London, vol. 2, Golden 
Years (London: Chatto and Windus, 1995), pp. 600–611; “The Great Crisis,” Bankers Mag­
azine (London) 98 (September 1914), pp. 318 (“disastrous”), 321–22, 331, 337 (“catastro­
phe”); John Maynard Keynes, “War and the Financial System, August 1914,” The Eco­
nomic Journal 24 (September 1914), pp. 461, 464, 471–73, 484 (quotes); see also Keynes, 
“The City of London and the Bank of England,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 29:1 
(November 1914), pp. 48–71. 
49 “The Situation,” Bankers Magazine 89:3 (September 1914), pp. 211 (quote), 212 
(quote); “Unsound Expedients Generated by War,” Bankers Magazine 89:4 (October 1914), 
p. 377 (quote). See also Jon Lawrence, Martin Dean, and Jean-Mouis Robert, “The Out­
break of War and the Urban Economy: Paris, Berlin, and London in 1914,” Economic His­
tory Review, n.s., (August 1992), pp. 564–93. 26  •  Chapter 1 
of macroeconomic disruptions and instability. The relative caution of Ger­
man ﬁnance was well known and often a source of frustration to the 
government. (Even Gerson Bleichro ¨ der, Bismarck’s personal ﬁnancial wiz­
ard, was known to fear war due to its ﬁnancial consequences.) The ap­
proach of the Great War did little to alter this basic disposition. During 
the Agadir Crisis of 1911, it was widely believed that the German bankers 
tied the hands of their government in response to the ﬁnancial distress 
exacerbated by the confrontation in 1911; this claim was almost certainly 
overstated, but it does accurately reﬂect the relative caution of the Ger­
man ﬁnancial community compared with other, more bellicose elements 
of German society in the years leading up to the war.50 According to Ken­
nedy, “Perhaps the most persistent economic lobby for good Anglo-Ger­
man relations were the ﬁnancial circles in the City of London and their 
equivalents in Frankfurt, Berlin and Hamburg.” The relative political 
weakness of the ﬁnancial community (and other elements in society wary 
of conﬂict) has been cited by others as a contributing cause of German 
aggressiveness in this era.51 
Nevertheless, despite its ﬁt to the theory, World War I is not chosen as 
a case for close study in this book, for two reasons. First and foremost, it 
would not offer a relatively pure test of the principal hypothesis, given 
the well-known preferences of ﬁnance in this setting. Second, a focus on 
the First World War would invite distraction and confusion over the issue 
of the relationship between interstate interdependence and war, which is 
not the focus of this book. While remaining aloof from this debate, it is 
relevant to note here that although the Great War is often used to ridicule 
the prophets of peaceful interdependence, Norman Angell and Ivan Bloch 
advocated rather than predicted peace, on the grounds that modern war 
50 See the reports prepared by Francis Oppenheimer, Britain’s commercial attache ´ in Ger­
many; reprinted in Gooch and Temperley, British Documents; “The German Financial Cri­
sis” October 21, 1911, vol. 7, The Agadir Crisis, pp. 796–805, and “Germany’s Financial 
Position,” vol. 11, The Outbreak of War, pp. 205–7; M. Chase Going, “German War Fi­
nance,” Journal of Political Economy 24:6 (June 1916), pp. 516–18, 542; Fritz Stern, Gold 
and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichro ¨ der and the Building of the German Empire (New York: Vin­
tage, 1979 [1977]), pp. 68, 72, 308, 417, 429; Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, 
and Foreign Policy: Essays on German Economic History (Berkeley: University of Califor­
nia Press, 1977), pp. 7, 40, 70, 83–84; Gregor Schollegen (ed.), Escape into War? The For­
eign Policy of Imperial Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 10; Fritz Fischer, 
War of Illusions (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 22, 24, 121, 137, 199–201, 203, 357–60, 
520–21; Niall Ferguson, Paper and Iron: Hamburg Business and German Politics in the 
Era of Inﬂation, 1897–1927 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 29, 91, 
94, 99, 113–18. 
51 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (Boston: Allen 
and Unwin, 1980), pp. 47–48, 302 (quote), 303–5, 435–37, 459; Paul Papayoanou, “Inter­
dependence, Institutions and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I,” 
International Security 20:4 (Spring 1996), pp. 70–71. What Does Finance Want?  •  27 
was no longer a rational method by which states could hope to gain in an 
economic sense. Included in those arguments were accurate assessments 
regarding the costly ﬁnancial disruptions that would (and did) accompany 
any such conﬂict.52 
The position of British ﬁnance before World War II was also not chosen 
as a case for similar reasons (and also in support of the goals in case selec­
tion of heterogeneity across countries and periods and of analytical nov­
elty). The struggles of the Treasury to manage Britain’s fragile interwar 
ﬁnances and the pressure this placed on defense expenditures are well 
known, as is the great sensitivity of government to the need to maintain 
ﬁnancial conﬁdence as an integral component of British power. This im­
posed even greater restraint on government borrowing and spending and 
thus inhibited rearmament. As one study concluded, “The decision to limit 
defense expenditure . . . had its roots in economic assumptions shared by 
the Treasury and the ﬁnancial community.” These concerns regarding the 
spending, borrowing, and inﬂationary implications of an arms race with 
Germany for sound ﬁnance in Britain contributed to the policy of appease­
ment. Indeed, for Polanyi, “England’s military unpreparedness was mainly 
a result of her adherence to gold standard economics.”53 
Not only did the City of London strongly favor the appeasement of 
Germany—and continued to do so right until the start of the war—the 
bankers directly participated in that aspect of the strategy known as “eco­
nomic appeasement.” Less infamous in history than its political counter­
part, economic appeasement was an effort by the City, the Treasury, and 
the Bank of England to keep Germany integrated with the international 
ﬁnancial system by granting one-sided economic concessions. The key­
52 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in 
Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 
1910), see esp. chapter 3, “The Great Illusion”; also pp. vi, 52 (on the consequences of 
“complex ﬁnancial interdependence” for the costs and beneﬁts of war), 54–56, 59–61, 372; 
Ivan S. Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? (Aldershot, England: Gregg Revivals, 1991 [1899]), 
pp. xlv, lxxix, 114, 347; see also Howard Weinrith, “Norman Angell and the Great Illusion: 
An Episode in Pre-1914 Paciﬁsm,” The Historical Journal 17:3 (September 1974), pp. 551, 
556–57, 564, 568–59. 
53 Robert  Shay,  British  Rearmament  in  the  Thirties:  Politics  and  Proﬁts  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 3–4, 23–26, 46–47, 75–78, 136–47, 159–62, 282– 
83, 288 (quote); G. C. Peden, The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906–1959 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 286, 288, 291, 298; Gustav Schmidt, The Politics 
and Economics of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy in the 1930s (New York: Berg, 
1986), pp. 32, 347–56, 383–84; R.A.C. Parker, “Economics, Rearmament and Foreign Pol­
icy: The United Kingdom before 1939—a Preliminary Study,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 10:4 (October 1975), pp. 637–69, 645; Bernd Ju ¨ rgen Wendt, “ ‘Economic Appease­
ment’: A Crisis Strategy,” in Wolfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), The Fascist 
Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 
161, 169; Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 246. 28  •  Chapter 1 
stone of this enterprise was the “standstill agreements,” the provision by 
British banks of short-term credits to Germany in order to ﬁnance trade 
that would otherwise have been frozen by the standstill agreement of 
1931. Economic appeasement was also aimed at empowering the German 
“moderates,” such as the enigmatic president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar 
Schacht, who had previously resigned as ﬁnance minister in part due to 
his concerns for the inﬂationary consequences of excessive defense spend­
ing. But the resolute commitment of the City to avoid war with Germany 
outlived any reasonable hope that the strategy was working. Despite com­
ing under increased criticism from members of Parliament, the standstill 
agreements were renewed every year through 1938—and negotiations for 
their extension took place in May 1939—by which point Schacht had 
been removed.54 
British ﬁnance was thus not only a leading advocate of appeasement 
but also, in both private and public capacities, an important practitioner 
of economic appeasement, which both reﬂected and reinforced its strong 
preference to avoid war at virtually all cost. Despite the ﬁt of this case to 
the theory, it does not receive closer attention here; it has been ably and 
extensively studied elsewhere, and the case has relatively little to offer in 
terms of variation across countries, periods, and analytical themes. 
In contrast, the cases that follow feature all of the attributes that I enu­
merated as ideal for evaluating the claims of this book. The United States 
before the Spanish-American War offers an excellent opportunity to com­
pare the appeasing bankers hypothesis with Marxist arguments, since 
both Hobson and Lenin cited the war speciﬁcally as a supporting exam­
ple. The relatively low military risks of the war for the United States also 
provide the opportunity to separate out a baseline disposition of “aver­
sion to war” from “prudence” derived from concerns about the risks of 
military defeat. And the nature of the American economy at the time also 
makes it especially easy to isolate the preferences of the ﬁnancial commu­
nity. Japan in the interwar period presents a distinct setting and, with two 
speciﬁc turning points in its external ambition, provides an outstanding 
proving ground for the principal hypothesis of the book. The different 
choices of the 1920s and 1930s more generally also illustrate how various 
54 Scott Newton, Proﬁts of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appease­
ment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 58, 62, 65–66, 91, 93; Neil Forbes, “London 
Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and ‘Economic Appeasement’ in the 1930s,” 
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 40:4 (1987), pp. 573, 583–84, 585–86; C. A. MacDon­
ald, “Economic Appeasement and the German ‘Moderates,’ 1937–1939,” Past and Present 
56 (August 1972), pp. 105–8, 115, 121, 128; David Kynaston, The City of London, vol. 3, 
Illusions of Gold, 1914–1945 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1999), pp. 441–46, 450–53; 
Paul Einzig, Appeasement before, during, and after the War (London: Macmillan, 1942), 
pp. 9–10, 15, 22, 76–77, 83. What Does Finance Want?  •  29 
actors within Japan had distinct visions of the national interest and how 
these very different conceptions were reﬂected in preferences about eco­
nomic policy. France before World War II brings still further variation in 
terms of its political-economic setting. This case is also especially im­
portant in illustrating how the preferences of ﬁnance can be suboptimal, 
contributing to an overly cautious national security strategy.55 The United 
States from the early cold war through the Korean War confronts the 
argument with a “hard case,” given the economic, ideational, and interna­
tional political setting of the time. The combination of dollar hegemony, 
postwar Keynesianism, and the early cold war suggests an extraordinarily 
permissive ﬁnancial environment that would be uncharacteristically con­
ducive to the ﬁnancial community’s supporting a more assertive national 
security posture. I chose British ﬁnance during the Falklands War as a 
potentially contrary case, designed to press against the limits of the argu­
ment; there were very good reasons why ﬁnance should have supported 
this war. Embedded in that chapter (chapter 6) as a “shadow case” is a 
consideration of the politics of the war in Argentina. The Falklands crisis 
is also especially attractive in that it presents a virtually unique laborato­
rylike setting: the crisis was long enough to allow for lengthy and vigorous 
debate, but short enough so that unlike any of the other cases, it was 
the single dominant political discussion in Britain and Argentina for the 
duration of the confrontation. 
In sum, collectively the chapters that follow evaluate the principal hy­
pothesis of this book (that of ﬁnancial caution), illustrate the contestation 
of the national interest through the lens of the preferences of the ﬁnancial 
community on the question of war, and highlight the costs and constraints 
often imposed by ﬁnancial market forces. Chapter 7 ties these strands 
together to consider how and why this matters. It revisits the attributes 
of ﬁnancial caution as a variable in international relations theory and 
explores the role of international ﬁnancial markets as a systemic inﬂuence 
on the use of force. Drawing on theoretical arguments and informed by 
the insights the cases offer, the concluding chapter also enumerates the 
domestic, international, and ideological factors that contribute to the rela­
55 Unlike all the other cases, interwar France does not offer a pure test of the principal 
hypothesis of the book. Prior to this book I was aware of the salience of French monetary 
orthodoxy in the interwar period, and although I had not previously explored the prefer­
ences of the French ﬁnancial community before the Second World War, I was familiar with 
arguments that the fragility of the franc inhibited the assertiveness of France in responding 
to the rising German threat, in particular to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. 
(Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Mone­
tary Power [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995], pp. 92–93.) However, given the 
other very attractive features of the case, and many other pure “tests” offered in all the 
other chapters, I made the decision that there was much to be gained by including the case. 30  •  Chapter 1 
tive inﬂuence of ﬁnance across different countries and periods. This in 
turn informs a discussion of the implications of appeasing bankers for 
contemporary international politics—the inﬂuence of the preferences of 
domestic ﬁnancial interests and the role of ﬁnancial globalization in shap­
ing the capabilities, interests, and proclivities of the United States and 
China and in empowering and inhibiting other actors in world politics, 
from large states to transnational terrorist organizations. 